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ABSTRACT Indigenous peoples regularly regard international law as a very important tool for the advancement
of their political goals. This is most likely because in many nation-states their opportunities for influencing
political development are rather limited. Even though international law seems to be an important means for
indigenous peoples to advance their goals, these peoples should be aware of its inherent limitations. One such
shortcoming is that international law seriously restricts indigenous peoples' opportunities to participate in the
international law-making processes; that is treaty and customary law. The contention in this article is that the
recent norm-making method of soft law provides indigenous peoples with a better opportunity for influential
participation than is afforded them by traditional methods. If these peoples are to benefit from this opportunity,
however, we must realise the revolutionary potential of the concept: a potential that is suffocated if the concept is
understood only from the perspective of international law. A good example of indigenous peoples gaining a
better standing in inter-governmental co-operation is the Arctic Council, which based its work on the soft-law
approach from the outset. There would seem to be good prospects for adopting the Arctic Council's approach in
other regions of the world in order to improve indigenous peoples' international representational status.
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Introduction
Indigenous peoples regularly regard international law as a very important tool for the advancement of their
political goals. This is most likely because in many nation-states their opportunities for influencing political
development are rather limited.  In this light, it would seem to be a worthwhile strategy for them to try to
influence the development of international law, which has the authority to impose legal obligations on all states
(customary law) or states party to an international treaty.  As many of the problems of today can be solved only
at the global or regional level, indigenous peoples are also quite naturally interested in gaining access to the
international treaty-making processes.  In the case of many global and regional problems, be these associated
with economic globalisation or the environment, indigenous peoples find themselves the recipients of
developments that take place outside their sphere of influence.
In the Arctic, a region distant from where these developments originate, indigenous peoples suffer from
various economic, social and environmental problems of a global and regional nature.  Global environmental
problems are a particular cause of concern, because the Arctic and its ecosystems are vulnerable when it comes
to human-induced pollution.  Some of the worst global environmental problems, for example persistent organic
pollutants (POPs), ozone depletion and the greenhouse effect, pose serious threats particularly in the Arctic,
which has not contributed to their existence.  (Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme 2003; 2004).
Therefore, it is not surprising that the Arctic indigenous peoples have been active in international environmental
negotiation processes, in particular the making of the 2001 Stockholm POPs Convention but increasingly also
with regard to the climate change regime (Flöjt 2003: 359–374; Watt-Cloutier 2001).
Even though international law seems to be an important means for indigenous peoples to advance their goals,
we would argue that they should be aware of its inherent limitations.  One such shortcoming, and the focus of
this article, is that international law seriously restricts indigenous peoples’ opportunities to participate in the
international law-making processes, those of treaty and customary law.  Our contention here will be that the
recent norm-making method of soft law in fact provides indigenous peoples with a better opportunity for
influential participation than is afforded to them by traditional methods.1  If indigenous peoples, which already
have often resorted to soft law, are to benefit from this opportunity, we must realise the revolutionary potential
of the concept, a potential often totally forgotten.  A good example of indigenous peoples gaining a better
standing in inter-governmental co-operation is the Arctic Council, which based its work on the soft law approach
from the outset.  There would seem to be good prospects for adopting the Arctic Council’s approach in other
regions of the world in order to improve indigenous peoples’ international representational status.
Who can participate in the making of international law?
International legal rules and principles are created in two ways (Cassese 2005: 193–194).2  In the first, customary
law, norms are created when states develop a certain custom that gradually becomes seen as legally required.
These norms can be general in nature, legally obligating all the states of the world, or regional in application,
requiring certain behaviour within a particular area.  The second source of norms is international treaties, which
obligate only those states that are parties to them.  In both cases, it is states that create the norms, reflecting the
close connection between the norm-making process and the principle of state sovereignty.  This is the basic
premise of international law: since states are sovereign, they can only be legally bound by norms to which they
voluntarily consent, either implicitly (customary law) or explicitly (treaties).
In international law, the doctrine of subjects (or legal persons) determines who may bear rights and
obligations.  Traditionally, the doctrine has been rather clear: states are the subjects of international law.  Yet,
increasingly, arguments have been put forward that new legal persons have come into existence.  For example,
organisations of states (inter-governmental organisations, IGOs) can acquire the status of a legal person in
international law (International Court of Justice 1949), but developments seem to have gone even further than
this.
The doctrine as described in standard modern textbooks celebrates the fact that today international law
contains an extensive number of obligations and rights that pertain to entities other than states, e.g., individuals,
indigenous peoples, liberation movements, and companies (Malanczuk 1997).  What the textbooks often fail to
reveal, however, is that while these actors may have legal rights and obligations in international law, for
example, where a treaty accords a human right to an individual, they cannot participate in the making of legal
norms.  In this respect, not much has changed: it is primarily states that are capable of creating international legal
norms.
Might this situation change as new actors increasingly influence the international law-making processes? It is
nowadays commonplace to say that the principle of sovereignty of states is in decline, the argument being that
nation-states cannot exercise their freedom with the host of legal obligations that constrain their actions in almost
all policy areas.  Indeed, we might argue that the basic principle of international law, state sovereignty, is
changing, a development that should be reflected in the question of who can participate in the international law-
making process.
Although international law regards the principle of state sovereignty as a principle of customary law, and
thus one that can change over time through the regular customary law process, it must be acknowledged that any
change will be very slow, for the principle forms one of the building blocks of international society as we know
it today.  Indeed, international lawyers have sought to define the principle as a quasi-constitutional one, trying to
capture the difference between deep, or constitutional, principles of international law and normal regulatory
principles, which come and go with changes in the international political agenda (see Schrijver 1997: 1–3).
Scholars of international relations have noted the resilience of the principle of state sovereignty, although many
consider it a principle that should have passed into history (Holsti 2004: 28–72).  It seems fairly clear that we
cannot anticipate any rapid improvements in this respect in the foreseeable future.
On balance, it would seem that international law is not too promising an avenue for indigenous peoples, at
least when it comes to participating in international law-making processes.  Indigenous peoples do not constitute
states. Few in fact have ambitions of statehood, with most working to establish some form of self-governance
within existing nation-states.  Without state status, however, indigenous peoples are excluded from international
law-making processes. They are regularly categorised as non-governmental organisations (NGOs) along with the
other groups participating in the international policy-making process, and have only very limited rights to
participate in that process.  This binary structure of representation leads to unjust and bizarre outcomes, with
industrial and environmental associations put on the same footing as indigenous peoples.
It would seem fair to distinguish between indigenous peoples and other groups when it comes to
representation in international law: if nothing else, indigenous peoples’ organisations represent peoples, not
interest-based constituencies such as the members of environmental organisations.  On the other hand,
indigenous peoples are not as yet perceived as being equal in status to peoples of recognised states but, rather, as
possessing a measure of self-government within existing states.  This intermediate position representing peoples,
but within existing states, should be reflected in indigenous peoples’ status in international treaty-making.  One
might well enquire concerning the kind of self-determination rights the present system of international law
accords to indigenous peoples.  It seems self evident that the more rights of self governance indigenous peoples
possess, the more influence they should have in international treaty making
In fact, indigenous peoples are the only general category of peoples that have demanded self-determination
and to whom certain distinct collective rights have been accorded in international law (Kingsbury 2003:
211–254; International Labour Organisation 1989).3  This has also brought about an international movement of
indigenous peoples, which was largely behind the push towards trying to adopt a declaration on the rights of
indigenous peoples in the United Nations.  In the words of the Draft United Nations Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples: ‘Indigenous peoples have the right of self-determination.  By virtue of that right they freely
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development’ (United
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 1994–95).4
State practice still varies as to what the status of indigenous peoples is in international law (Wiessner 2003).5
One emergent view has been that indigenous peoples do have a right to self-determination but not in the sense in
which that concept was understood in the colonial context.  The right to self-determination is seen as granting
indigenous peoples internal self-determination, the right to determine their future within the existing nation-
states, not the right to secede from existing nation-states.  There is still disagreement as to which areas of policy
are parts of the right to internal self-determination of indigenous peoples.  At the moment, most international
legal scholars are of the opinion that ‘soft’ areas of policy, such as cultural issues, are already part of the valid
principle of internal self-determination, whereas ‘hard’ areas, such as land ownership and taxation, are not.6
The problem is that even though we might conclude that indigenous peoples should gain an improved status
from their self-governance rights in international treaty-making, this has not happened in practice: indigenous
peoples are regularly categorised as NGOs.  Moreover, even though some soft and hard law instruments provide
in quite straightforward terms that indigenous peoples should be entitled to participate in decision-making at all
levels affecting them, this does not hold true at the international level.7
There is a clear movement towards internal self-determination in the Arctic: indigenous peoples in the region
primarily strive for some sort of self-governance within existing states rather than attempting to secede from
states.  The only self-governance arrangement in which an indigenous people has occasionally expressed a desire
for independence is that of the Inuit in Greenland.  Two basic internal self-governance models that have been
used in the Arctic are public government models, which give all the residents of a northern region a degree of
self-government (for example, Nunavut and Greenland), and self-government based on indigenous membership
only (for example, native tribal governments in Alaska) (Arctic Human Development Report 2004: chapters 5,
6).  However, even the most ambitious internal self-governance structures in the Arctic, for example, Nunavut in
Canada, cannot overcome the threat posed by global environmental and other problems reaching the Arctic:
while an Arctic indigenous people may control local policy, it does not have competence in international affairs,
the level of decision-making where global problems are managed (Heinämäki  2004: 240).8
Soft law as a new way of making international norms
Over the course of some 30 years, a new method of creating international norms, known as soft law, has
seemingly become institutionalised in international society.  The term refers to processes by which actors try to
create norms, although the outcome of those processes is not a legally binding international treaty.  Good
examples are declarations and action programmes, which often contain very broad and vague normative
guidance.9  There is no consensus as to whether soft law is accepted in international law as one of the sources of
that law, and there is serious disagreement regarding the extent to which soft law norms are binding (Weil 1983;
Klabbers 1996; Chinkin 2000).  Nevertheless, it seems that the method is now commonly used in international
co-operation.  The participants in this co-operation realise that while the norms adopted are not legally binding,
they are binding in at least some manner.
Most scholars of international law understand soft law as referring to normative instruments adopted by
states but without the intention of creating internationally legally binding norms.  Soft law instruments and
norms are thus understood as non-binding in international law but binding in some other manner, for instance,
politically.  They are mostly seen as the first step in the development of a norm that will, in time, mature into
hard law, that is, treaty law or customary law (Shelton 2000).  Yet, in our view there is more to the concept of
soft law than merely the present consensus that it is non-binding in international law but binding in some other
manner.  The concept in fact contains the seeds of revolutionary change.  Whether these take root is of course a
matter that will be determined by general political developments, but the concept as such does have this
potential.
Where is the revolutionary potential in soft law? Even though soft law is a hotly contested issue in
international law, consensus is emerging as to its basic contents:
1. There is a means in international society (soft law) to create norms that are non-binding in international
law.
2. These norms are binding in some other manner than they are in international law; politically, morally, or
softly.
Together, these two basic elements, which seem to have been accepted, provide international society with a
radically new method of norm-making.  With the idea of soft law now institutionalised, there exists a norm-
making procedure, at least in the minds of non-lawyers, that is not dependent on international law and its state-
based structures.  (This does not hold true for international lawyers, who consider soft law instruments to be part
of the operation of the international legal order.)
When an international treaty-making process is set in motion, numerous rules come into play.  The
customary law of treaties sets out rules as to who is competent to participate in the process (states and, in some
cases, IGOs), what kinds of rights states have during the process, what their obligations are, where the treaty is
silent on certain matters, and the like.  The customary law of treaties, which for the most part is codified in the
1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, is very much built on the deep principles of international law,
that is, state sovereignty and the formal equality of states.10  It is also important to note that in some states the
constitution requires at least some consultation with the national parliament before a treaty is signed and some
form of approval by the parliament before it can be ratified.  The treaty process is thus very much connected with
the workings of the national legal systems of the states that are negotiating a treaty, making the conclusion of
international treaties increasingly complicated and at the same time increasing the temptation to use soft-law
instruments in international norm-making.
Clearly, if international actors set out to create something that will not be a treaty, for example a soft law
instrument or a soft law organisation, the customary law of treaties will not provide them with any regulatory
guidance.  By the same token, the constitutional law of the participating states will not apply, and thus will not
complicate the process.  Herein lies the revolutionary nature of soft law:
1. If the norm-making process starts with the idea that the entire process operates outside of international
law because it is non-legally binding, the possibility arises of expanding the range of participants in that
co-operation (see Reinicke and Witte 2000);
2. Precisely because soft law is still considered to be binding in some other manner, it is an authoritative
norm-making procedure that empowers non-state actors to take part in important regulatory activity in
international society. (Koivurova 2002a)
The soft law method would seem to offer indigenous peoples more opportunities to influence the
development of international norms than do the traditional law-making methods of international law.  They
would at least be able to participate in the international norm-making process with a status other than that of
regular NGO, which carries very limited rights of influence.  It is important to bear in mind that even though
indigenous peoples are treated as NGOs in regular soft law making processes, the exception being the Arctic
Council, as explained below, they have at least a better chance of participating with a status different from that
given them in treaty-making processes.
An interesting example in this regard is the Arctic-wide co-operation process that started with the signing in
1991 of the Declaration on the Protection of the Arctic Environment and the Arctic Environmental Protection
Strategy (AEPS) by the eight states of the region (the five Nordic states, Canada, the United States and the
Russian Federation) (Arctic Council website: <http://www.arctic-council.org/en/main/infopage/6; also see
Rothwell 1996: 221–257; Koivurova 2002b: 69–94).  In this first phase of co-operation, generally referred to as
AEPS co-operation, the framework organisations of the Arctic indigenous peoples were entitled to some
position, as provided in the AEPS: ‘In order to facilitate the participation of Arctic indigenous peoples the
following organizations will be invited as observers: the Inuit Circumpolar Conference, the Nordic Saami
Council and the U.S.S.R. Association of Small Peoples of the North.’11
Yet, it was the establishment of the Arctic Council in 1996 that really clarified and enhanced the status of the
Arctic indigenous peoples.  The first paragraph of the founding declaration of the Council, which was to
continue AEPS co-operation, provides: ‘The Arctic Council is established as a high level forum to: provide a
means for promoting cooperation, coordination and interaction among the Arctic States, with the involvement of
the Arctic indigenous communities and other Arctic inhabitants on common arctic issues, in particular issues of
sustainable development and environmental protection in the Arctic.’
In contrast to earlier policy, in which indigenous peoples’ organisations participated as observers, the
Declaration created the new category of permanent participant.  Paragraph 2 provides: ‘The Inuit Circumpolar
Conference, the Saami Council and the Association of Indigenous Minorities in the Far North, Siberia, the Far
East of the Russian Federation are Permanent Participants in the Arctic Council.  Permanent participation is
equally open to other Arctic organizations of indigenous peoples with majority Arctic indigenous
constituency.’12
It was also very important that the category of permanent participant was distinguished from that of observer,
defined in paragraph 3 of the Declaration, and that it was created ‘to provide for active participation and full
consultation with the Arctic indigenous representatives within the Arctic Council.’ (Arctic Council 1996).
Hence, even though the eight Arctic states are the members proper of the Council, framework organisations
of Arctic indigenous peoples have been given an unprecedented status in its work: they are permanent
participants, which negotiate at the same table with the Arctic states and may table proposals for decision (Arctic
Council 1998).  Even though final decisions are made by the Arctic states in consensus, the permanent
participants must, according to the Declaration, be fully consulted, which is close to a de facto power of veto
should they all reject a particular proposal.
From its inception, the Arctic states have not formalised the co-operation through an international treaty.13
AEPS co-operation began with the signing of the Declaration and Strategy, and the Arctic Council was
established through a signed declaration.  Various views have been presented as to the legal status of the Arctic
Council, the most common being that it is a soft law organisation operating outside international law (Bloom
1999: 712–722).  Even though no one seems to be able to determine what it means in practical terms that the
Council is a soft law organisation, it appears that the current consensus among both scholars and the participants
in the co-operation is to treat the Council as such an organisation (Koivurova 2002b: 69–94).  It is hard to see
how the framework organisations of Arctic indigenous peoples could have gained such an influential position if
a treaty had been concluded.14
Well into the final moments of the negotiations on the future form of the Arctic Council, the status of
indigenous peoples as permanent participants was threatened, particularly by the United States.  As Scrivener
(1999: 54) observes:
Concern about the potential emasculation of the permanent participant category was heightened by the
request of the Northern Forum and SCPAR that their future observer roles in the Council be given an element
of ‘permanency’.  It was also fuelled by a US suggestion that a special category of observers might be
appropriate for certain non-Arctic states active in the region — for example, the UK — distinct from other
observers, such as international organisations and nongovernmental groups.  The permanent participant issue
was partially resolved in the Council Declaration by confirming the status of the existing three
IPO’s…However, during the subsequent debate over the Council’s rules of procedure there were signs that
the US still preferred to equate the permanent participants with observers.15
Problems and possibilities
Even though the soft law method contains the potential outlined above, one should bear in mind that if
international law and lawyers can dictate how this norm-making method is to be understood, not much will
change.  In international law, the mainstream understanding considers soft law instruments and forms of co-
operation as things waiting to become hard law, that is treaty law or customary law.  In other words, soft law is
only the first step, and it is only when soft law rules and principles become accepted in international treaties that
they have their true impact.  In addition, and importantly, international law and lawyers normally consider only
state-driven instruments and co-operation processes to be examples of soft law: even now there are various
scholarly proposals to apply the customary law of treaties by analogy to soft law instruments (Hilgenberg 1999).
The revolutionary possibilities of soft law are stifled quite easily in the hands of international lawyers, who are
part of an age-old intellectual tradition that has sheltered the state-based paradigm of international society.
It is important to recognise the power of institutionalised traditions of thought, such as international law, in
the conduct of international relations.  The power of international law in international relations is many times
mistakenly thought of in terms of how the specific behavioural rules of international law are observed.  Yet,
international law plays a more influential role in the way it defines the basic rules of the game: who the basic
actors in international society are (the criteria for becoming a state, sovereignty of states), what their relationship
is to each other (for example non-interference in internal affairs of other states) and in what ways competent
international actors (states and their organisations) may create legally binding rules (international treaties and
customary law).  It is this structure that exerts enormous influence on how we conceive of international politics
and who can take part in it.16
Since the mainstream of international law, in contrast to certain of its specialised fields,17 protects the
existence of international society based primarily on states and their organisations, it is clear that the
revolutionary potential of soft law will not materialise easily.  Then again, it is important to remember that
everything changes.  According to basic social constructivist thinking, international society re-creates itself every
time the old structure is confirmed in an individual act, for example, when states conclude an international treaty.
But it is also possible for the actors in international society to create new ways of interacting which, in time, may
challenge the structures in that society today (Onuf 1994).  This might happen with the increasing use of soft-law
instruments that involve parties other than states as members.
Even though the soft law method can be interpreted, as international lawyers do, in a very constraining
manner, it does have the potential to revolutionise how international norms are made, that is, who creates them
and under what basic rules.  In each situation where the actors in international society are aware that soft law is
being created, there is a chance that they will come up with innovative ways to structure the co-operation.  For
example, it is always possible that indigenous peoples will be able to participate with a status other than that of
NGO but in the current international law-making process, this is very unlikely.18
The Arctic Council, with its unique model of participation, could well serve as a new model enabling
indigenous peoples to find a more reasonable status than that of NGO.  At present, indigenous peoples are
increasingly seen as the only distinct category of peoples other than nation-states that are entitled to self-
determination.  However, as mentioned above, this right does not as yet extend to a full right to secede from an
existing state; rather, indigenous peoples are entitled to govern their own affairs within states.  Nevertheless,
self-determination should grant indigenous peoples a better status in international policy-making, given that they
have no control over global problems via national and local self-governance structures.  Here, the soft law model
of the Arctic Council might lead the way, as it does not equate indigenous peoples with NGOs or states but gives
them a kind of intermediate position with permanent participant status but no formal decision-making power.  As
the work of the Arctic Council is based on soft law, states could be more willing than if its work was based on
hard law to grant the indigenous peoples a status that better reflects their status nationally.
The indigenous peoples’ movement has in fact explicitly referred to the Arctic Council as a model that could
be used in other regions of the world.  In preparation for the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development
(WSSD), the Indigenous Peoples’ Caucus Statement for the Multi-Stakeholder Dialogue on Governance,
Partnerships and Capacity-Building promoted sustainable development governance at all levels, in particular:
‘models for Environmental and Sustainable Development Governance, such as the Arctic Council which
incorporate principles of genuine partnership between States and Indigenous Peoples, ecosystem approaches,
collaboration between scientific and traditional knowledge, and local, national and regional implementation
plans’ (Indigenous Peoples’ Caucus Statement for the Multi-Stakeholder Dialogue on Governance, Partnerships
and Capacity-Building 2002).
If the Arctic Council model were increasingly used, it would, according to constructivist thinking, in time
challenge the traditional rules of who can participate in the making of international law and with what status.  It
might challenge the current anomaly that indigenous peoples participate as NGOs to international treaty-making
processes and thus possibly accommodate indigenous peoples as peoples with more powers than NGOs but
fewer than states.  In this way, the structures of international law could be adapted to provide a more nuanced
solution to the problem of international representation of indigenous peoples.
Notes
1. Thus far, this new soft method of law-making has been most prominent in environmental issues and the
sustainable development processes.
2. According to the accepted doctrine of sources in international law, which is codified in Article 38 of the
Statute of the International Court of Justice, there is also a third source, that is, ‘the general principles of law
recognized by civilized nations’, which has caused considerable disagreement. The principles are more
properly seen as a source that can be used by international courts when resolving disputes where no treaty
or customary law norms can be applied.
3. Evidently, there are also minority groups within the existing states that pursue self-governance, even
independence, but in legal terms it is only indigenous peoples that have gained increasing recognition of
their collective rights. It is thus no wonder that many minority groups have started to define themselves as
indigenous peoples, especially because there is no clear consensus on which peoples can be treated as
indigenous peoples in international law. On the other hand, the core of what constitutes an indigenous
people is clear, with all the Arctic indigenous peoples, for instance, clearly belonging to this category.
4. The process of completing the draft has been a protracted one. In 1982, the United Nations Economic and
Social Council (UNESCO) established a working group on indigenous populations charged with the task of
drafting a universal declaration on the rights of indigenous populations. The working group agreed on a draft
declaration in 1993, coinciding with the UN International Year of the World’s Indigenous People. The draft
was quite advanced in content, probably because it had been written primarily by experts and indigenous
peoples. It accorded extensive internal self-determination to indigenous peoples, which would have had a
strong impact on the rights of indigenous peoples. Unfortunately, when the document was forwarded to the
Commission on Human Rights, before the state representatives, the agreement broke down; as yet there is
no agreed text to be dealt with by the United Nations General Assembly. The Assembly requested that the
declaration be ready by the end of the UN Decade of the World’s Indigenous People, that is, by the end of
2004, but no consensus could be reached on the issue. The mandate of the working group under the
Commission on Rights trying to complete the draft was continued, and its work continues.
5. Kingsbury  (2005: 69–110) identifies five competing conceptual structures by which various states deal with
their indigenous peoples: human rights and non-discrimination claims; minority claims; self-determination
claims; historical sovereignty claims; and claims as indigenous peoples, including claims based on treaties
or other agreements between indigenous peoples and states.
6. On the other hand, there are examples of self-government agreements between a state and an indigenous
people under which the people in question have been granted quite extensive powers pertaining to taxation,
for example, many Yukon first nations in Canada. For the Yukon First Nations Umbrella Final Agreement
and self-government agreements of individual first nations, see Umbrella Final Agreement c.1993.
Environmental issues, on the other hand, can be seen as falling into the ‘soft area of politics’ and are dealt
with in internal self-government agreements. Provisions concerning the use, management and protection of
the environment mostly refer to particular lands where indigenous peoples have been granted certain rights.
However, as mentioned in the Introduction, many important environmental questions are often managed by
global or regional governance regimes. Participation by indigenous peoples in international negotiations can
be seen as an external element of self-determination (Henriksen 2001: 10) and as thus falling into the ‘hard’
area of politics. This important fact appears to have been forgotten almost totally in the discussion of self-
government, nor has it found a place in self-government agreements.
7. The Draft United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples contains a provision, Article 19,
which can be interpreted as entitling indigenous peoples to participate in international management:
‘Indigenous peoples have the right to participate fully, if they so choose, at all levels of decision-making in
matters which may affect their rights, lives and destinies through representatives chosen by themselves in
accordance with their own procedures, as well as to maintain and develop their own indigenous decision-
making institutions’.  See also the ‘international treaty’ that indigenous peoples have negotiated themselves
(International Covenant on the Rights of Indigenous Nations 1994), para. 17 of which provides: ‘Indigenous
Nations have the right to participate fully at all levels of decision-making in matters which may affect their
rights, lives or destinies by direct popular participation or through representatives chosen by themselves in
accordance with their own customs’. Articles 6 and 7 of the International Labour Organisation Convention on
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries can be interpreted as providing similar rights of
participation (International Labour Organisation 1989).
8. With regard to Nunavut, it should be pointed out that the Nunavut Agreement contains a provision giving the
Inuit at least a limited role in international environmental issues. It prescribes: ‘the Government of Canada
shall include Inuit representation in discussions leading to the formulation of government position in relation
to an international agreement relating to Inuit wildlife harvesting rights in the Nunavut Settlement Area, which
discussions shall extend beyond those discussions generally available to non-governmental organizations’
(Nunavut Agreement 1992).
9. On the other hand, as pointed out by Shelton, in some cases soft-law norms can have a very detailed and
specific normative content that is ‘harder’ than the soft commitments in treaties (Shelton 2000: 4).
Furthermore, the perceived softness or non-binding nature of the instrument sometimes allows the parties to
move into more detailed regulation in a speedier fashion.
10. The customary law of treaties protects the equality of all states, big or small, by according each and every
one the power to decide whether it will participate in a treaty-making process, whether it will sign the
outcome of the negotiations, and whether it will ultimately ratify the treaty.
11. See page 42 of the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy. Three organisations have since been accepted
as permanent participants in the work of the Arctic Council: the Aleut International Association, the Gwich’in
Council International, and the Arctic Athabascan Council.
12. More specific rules are laid out that define the selection criteria for the indigenous peoples’ organisations
referred to in paragraph 2. In order to be eligible to become a permanent participant, an organisation must
be ‘representing: a. single indigenous people resident in more than one Arctic State; or b. more than one
Arctic indigenous people resident in a single Arctic State’. In addition, according to the same paragraph, the
determination that such an organisation has met this criterion is to be made by a decision of the Council. At
any given time, the number of permanent participants should be fewer than the number of members in the
Council, that is, eight. Currently, there are six framework organisations of Arctic indigenous peoples that
have the status of permanent participant.
13. There have been some recent challenges by the observers to the Arctic Council as to its soft-law nature.
The World Conservation Union (IUCN) has studied whether it would be possible to draw lessons from the
other polar regime, the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS). On the basis of Nowlan’s study, the IUCN convened
an expert meeting in 2004 to consider whether the ATS could provide the needed input for the development
of environmental protection in the Arctic, and also whether the Arctic co-operation should be formalised. The
expert meeting was divided over the way environmental protection should and could be developed. The
main approach to Arctic governance identified at the meeting was not to borrow from the Antarctic
experience but to study which environmental protection issues should be addressed at which level, that is,
universal (global treaties and processes), regional (the Arctic Council), bilateral, national¸ and sub-national
(Nowlan 2001; Smith 2004).
14. It should be emphasised, however, that this is not due to constraints laid down by the customary law of
treaties. According to that body of law, states would have been perfectly free to create a treaty permitting the
participation of indigenous peoples as permanent participants who must be consulted before actual
decision-making by the member states. The biggest obstacle to establishing participation rights for
indigenous peoples in a treaty would have arisen from the factual setting. When an international treaty is
concluded, different officials are involved than when a soft-law instrument is created. Foreign ministries and
their legal offices would have been involved, and their views would in all likelihood have resulted in
indigenous peoples’ being given the status they normally have in international treaties, that of NGO. Another
possible obstacle would have been the involvement of national parliaments, which might also have
challenged the position of indigenous peoples.
15. Scrivener continues: ‘Canada and the ICC were quick to notice the extent to which the early US drafts of the
rules of procedure, while correctly emphasising the intergovernmental nature of the Council, intentionally
clawed back the advantages of the permanent participants relative to the status in the Council of Observers,
in essence equating the former with the latter. With the exception of Russia, the other Arctic states
supported Canada in re-asserting the ‘specialness’ of the permanent participants and their right to be fully
consulted before the member governments reach collective decisions’ (Scrivener 1999: 56).
16. For an interesting argument that international law is the prime ideology of the international political system,
see Scott (1994).
17. The specialised fields of international law, such as the developing law relating to indigenous peoples, tend to
view the classical system of international law critically; see, for example, Anaya (1996).
18. Another way in which the indigenous peoples have tried to achieve a better status in international law and
politics is legal action against states, exemplified by the possible Inuit Circumpolar Conference human rights
petition against the United States (Heinämäki and Koivurova 2005). An even more radical method employed
by indigenous peoples is to conclude international ‘treaties’ among themselves. After 17 years of
discussions, meetings and negotiations, the Covenant on the Rights of Indigenous Nations was initialled in
Geneva, Switzerland, on 28 July 1994 by representatives of indigenous nations only. By virtue of this
agreement, the new International Covenant would remain open for ratification, for at least the twelve months
from the date of the agreement, by the world's more than 5000 indigenous nations. However, it seems that
this ‘international treaty’ between indigenous peoples has not been received with much enthusiasm, and it is
likely to remain a pioneering initiative with potential impact in the distant future (International Covenant on
the Rights of Indigenous Nations 1994).
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